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PART I

CONTRACT LAW AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS IN M&A, INCLUDING DRAFTING OF ACQUISITION AGREEMENTS

Chapter 2 General Principles in Drafting an Acquisition Agreement—Merger Agreement, Asset Acquisition Agreement, and Stock Purchase Agreement

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