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§ 12:10 DePuy Synthes Products, Inc. v. Veterinary Orthopedic Implants, Inc. 279
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§ 12:14 Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp. 290
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§ 12:15 Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. v. Oxford Nanopore Technologies, Inc. 293
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§ 12:17 *In re* Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 298
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§ 12:18 Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC 300
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§ 13:5	Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics Inc. <i>Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), a judgment is final except for an accounting when all liability issues have been resolved, and only a determination of damages remains.</i>	322
§ 13:6	Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics Inc. <i>When FRAP 4(a)(4) pertains to interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), the enumerated motions can only toll the time to appeal if they relate to the interlocutory judgment such that the judgment is not final except for an accounting until the court disposes of the motions.</i>	324

- § 13:7 *Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp.* 327
Majority: licensing program that charged flat fee for one or all patents provided insufficient basis for apportioning damages between conventional and improved components. Dissent: jury came to reasonable award based on licenses and proper jury instruction.
- § 13:8 *Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc.* 331
A finding of non-infringement does not by itself moot a request for declaratory judgment of invalidity. Here, the district court’s purported “final judgment” based on its summary judgment of non-infringement did not constitute a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); however, that jurisdictional defect was “cured” during oral argument when unresolved claim was “given up.”

**Chapter 14 Ownership Agreements
 and Inventorship** 335

- § 14:1 *Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. International Trade Commission* 335
Assignment’s temporal limitations limited inventors’ obligations to subject matter that itself could be protected as intellectual property before the termination of employment (even if any formal government grants needed for protection may not have been acquired).
- § 14:2 *Omni MedSci, Inc. v. Apple Inc.* 338
Majority: “shall be the property of” language in university bylaws was not present assignment language sufficient to transfer ownership of patents to university. Dissent: “shall be” language reflected employment agreement intent that the university own future inventions.

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<i>In determining coextensiveness for obviousness analysis, the question is not whether unclaimed features are insignificant to a product's ornamental design. The question is instead whether unclaimed features are "insignificant," period.</i>	
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